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1 Introduction 
 
1.1 Statement of the problem 
Legal principles are used frequently by international courts when interpreting provisions and 
ruling cases. The principle of proportionality is one of the most important legal principles in 
this regard. If Courts recognize a general principle of law, the question still remains on how 
they decide the content and scope of such principles.  
 
1.2 Background/rationale for this thesis 
The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) is a multilateral agreement which 
served to regulate international trade. It was signed in 1947 and lasted until The Marrakesh 
Agreement
1
 was signed 15 April 1994 and established the World Trade Organization (WTO). 
GATT is still in effect under the WTO framework, but it was subject to modifications by 
GATT 1994.  
 
The organization has 160 members as of 26 June 2014
2
. The WTO works to facilitate trade. 
Essentially, the WTO is a place where member governments try to sort out the trade problems 
they face with each other
3
. Negotiations were a key to the establishment of the WTO and ne-
gotiations remain a key to further development of the organization. In a nutshell, the WTO 
mainly includes agreements on trade with goods, services and intellectual property.  
 
The Treaty of Rome entered into force in 1959 and established the European Economic 
Community (TEEC)
4
. The Treaty of Lisbon entered into force 1
st
 December 2009 and estab-
lished the European Union, which replaced the European Community (EC). The European 
Union took over all of the rights and obligations of EC.   
 
                                                 
1
 Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, April 15 1994 
2
 World Trade Organization, Understanding the WTO: The Organization: Members and Observers (2014) 
3
 World Trade Organization, Understanding the WTO: Who we are (2014) 
4
 Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community, March 25 1957 
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Both the WTO and the EU are trade liberalization regimes in the sense that they facilitate in-
ternational trade.  
 
The principle of proportionality is a “prominent legal principle in many legal orders, and all 
legal systems have to undertake different forms of balancing, both in determining the content 
of rules and in their application”.5 The principle of proportionality has influenced balancing 
tests in both international and national legal systems. 
  
There is broad consensus that the proportionality principle is part of international law and 
many national legal systems. However, there has been a debate on whether the principle of 
proportionality can be considered a general principle of both WTO and EU law.  
The main question in this paper is whether proportionality is a general principle of law. I will 
further look at the application of the principle of proportionality in WTO law and EU law.  
 
Even though there has been some disagreement on whether the principle of proportionality is 
an overarching principle in WTO law, there is no doubt that proportionality has had some 
impact on the development of WTO law. This will be further examined in chapter 4. The 
same can be said in regard to the EU, which will be further examined in chapter 5.   
 
In general, legal provisions focus on the principle of proportionality within the WTO and EU 
without giving too much attention to its definition or meaning under international law.
6
  
 
Reference to general principles and fundamental freedoms in EU law are connected and not 
always easy to distinguish.
7
 The principle of proportionality is adopted in varying degrees in 
several international systems/courts, hereunder the WTO, EU and the European Convention 
on Human Rights.   
 
                                                 
5
 Andenæs, Mads and Stefan Zleptnig, Proportionality: WTO Law: In Comparative Perspective. In: Texas  
Journal of International Law, Volume 42:371 (2007), p. 371-423 on p. 373 
6
 Mitchell, Andrew D., Legal Principles in WTO Disputes. 1st ed. Cambridge, 2008. P. 6 
7
 Neergaard, Ulla and Ruth Nielsen, EU ret. 6. ed. København, 2010. 
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General principles of law can derive from both treaties, case law, soft law, directives or other 
sources. The classification of a principle as a general legal principle is not dependent on a 
special legal source.
8
  
 
1.3 Objectives 
The main objective of this thesis is to compare the application of the proportionality principle 
as defined in chapter 2 in WTO law and EU law. It aims to give an overview over the relevant 
cases in WTO law and EU law on the proportionality principle and comment on similarities 
and challenges in the application. National systems can also be said to have adopted the prin-
ciple of proportionality
9
, but this lies beyond the scope of this thesis.  
 
The aim is not to contribute to the debate on whether proportionality is to be considered a 
principle of law, but rather to shed some light on some legal provisions and cases where parts 
of a proportionality act or balancing act is required.  
 
1.4 Methodology 
The thesis will present a theoretical perspective on legal principles in general and specifically 
what the scope and application of the proportionality principle is in WTO law and EU law. In 
general, however, the thesis will carry a case law approach. A case law approach is necessary 
if you consider article 3.2 of the DSU, which states that the dispute settlement system of the 
WTO serves “to clarify the existing provisions…in accordance with customary rules of inter-
pretation of public international law.”10  
 
I will give reference to a number of cases under WTO and EU framework to illustrate how the 
principle of proportionality is applied within these areas of law. The examples of case law are 
not to be understood as a complete review of cases in WTO law and EU law where the princi-
ple of proportionality is given reference. Even though I have tried to use several different cas-
                                                 
8
 Neergaard (2010) p. 162 
9
 Sweet, Alec Stone and Jud Matthews. Proportionality Balancing and Global Constitutionalism. In: Columbia 
Journal of Transnational Law, Volume 47 (2008), p. 73-165. P. 1 and 28 
10
 Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes, April 15 1994, Article 3.2 
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es to shed some light on the application of the principle, there are many others that could be 
relevant in this regard.  
 
To better understand the principle of proportionality, there will be given a short introduction 
of the historical perspective of the principle. I believe the best way to examine the thesis is by 
means of comparing the area of WTO law with EC law, where the principle of proportionality 
is more widely recognized. This will be done by giving examples of cases where the principle 
of proportionality is shown. I will comment on the cases and how the principle was used. 
Thereafter I will try to summarize the differences of the two areas of law.  
 
1.5 Structure of the thesis 
Chapter 2 establishes a framework for the proportionality principle, including the historical 
background, the content and scope of the principle and the rationale for international courts to 
use legal principles in the adjudication of disputes.  
 
Chapter 3 gives a short explanation of the dispute settlement systems in WTO law and EU 
law. This is done to facilitate the understanding on how cases develop in the two systems.  
 
The main emphasis of this thesis is on chapter 4, where the use of the proportionality princi-
ple within WTO law and EU law is illustrated by a review of the most important legal provi-
sions and relevant case law.  
 
Chapter 5 aims to conclude the findings in the thesis, but also point to some challenges that 
may arise by allowing Courts to apply the proportionality principle and other legal principles 
as a basis for their adjudication.  
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2 Understanding the principle of proportionality 
2.1 Historical background 
The framework of the proportionality principle can be traced back to German administrative 
law in the 19
th
 century.
11
 It was used “as a criterion for determining the validity of police 
measures, checking whether discretionary powers were exercised in a manner excessively 
restrictive to the freedom of the private citizen”.12 Other administrative courts also applied 
similar techniques of control.  
 
This involved new encroachments on private freedoms that required new constraints on public 
power and judicial balancing between these two variables. In this manner the rule of law was 
extended at the same time as property rights were reduced. Subsequently the principle became 
engrained in national administrative law. More recently among constitutional lawyers propor-
tionality has been hailed as the primary principle that enables constitutional review of state 
action.
13
 
 
Having put the principle of proportionality very briefly into its historical background, I now 
move on to defining the content and scope of the principle.   
 
2.2 Content and scope of the principle of proportionality 
Once an international court or tribunal has decided to draw upon general principles of law as a 
source of international law, the question arises as to how it will determine the existence, con-
tents and scope of application of an applicable general principle of law. 
14
 
 
Proportionality is commonly referred to as a legal principle. It can also be described as a test 
or a standard, but its legal character is one of a principle.
15
 Proportionality is a prominent le-
                                                 
11
 Mitchell (2008) p. 185 
12
 Taskovska, Dobrinka, On Historical and Theoretical Origins of the Proportionality Principle – A contribution 
towards a prospective comprehensive debate on proportionality. In: Iustinianus Primus Law Review, Vol-
ume 3:1 (2012), pp. 1-11. P. 1 
13
 Sauter, Wolf, Proportionality in EU law: a balancing act?. TILEC Discussion Paper, DP 2013-003 (2013) 
14
 Raimondo, Fabián Omar, General principles of law in the decisions of international criminal courts and tri-
bunals. PhD thesis (2007). P. 48  
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gal principle in many legal orders, and all legal systems have to undertake different forms of 
balancing, both in determining the content of rules and in their application.
16
 
 
It is difficult to define a general content and scope of the principle of proportionality. One key 
challenge is that the principle of proportionality may have different meanings within differing 
legal systems. One should therefore exercise caution about ascribing the same meaning to the 
concept whenever the word proportionality is to be found in any guise.
17
 Neither the EU Trea-
ties nor the WTO Agreement contain explicit reference to the principle of proportionality with 
regard to reviewing the legality of EU actions or Member State actions.  
 
For the purposes of this thesis I will define the principle of proportionality as it is most com-
monly defined in the EU legal order. This definition is also applied in WTO law, notably by 
Jan Jans
18
 and more recently by Andenas and Zleptnig
19
. Following this definition, the princi-
ple of proportionality consists of three different elements; suitability, necessity and propor-
tionality stricto sensu. The assessment of suitability reviews whether a measure is suitable or 
appropriate to achieve the objective pursued. The assessment of necessity considers whether 
there exists an alternative measure which is less trade restrictive than the measure at issue. 
The less trade-restrictive measure must be at least equally effective in achieving the pursued 
objective. The final step assess whether the effects of a measure are disproportionate  or ex-
cessive with regard to the involved interests. Andenæs and Zleptnig holds with regard to the 
third element, proportionality stricto sensu; “It is at this stage that a true weighing and balanc-
ing of competing objectives takes place. The more intense the restriction of a particular inter-
est, the more important the justification for the countervailing objective needs to be.”20  
 
The principle of proportionality is sometimes compared to the Wednesbury unreasonableness 
in UK law. However, Wednesbury unreasonableness can be said to be far less intrusive and 
                                                                                                                                                        
15
 Andenæs (2007) p. 378  
16
 Andenæs (2007) p. 373 
17
 Craig, Paul and Gráinne De Búrca, EU Law: texts, cases and materials. 5th ed. Oxford, 2011. P. 526 
18
 Jans, Jan H., Proportionality Revisited. In: Legal Issues of Economic Integration 27:3 (2000), pp. 239–265.p. 
240-241 
19
 Andenas (2007) p. 388 
20
 Andenæs (2007) p. 389 
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more respectful of governemental discretion.
21
 The principle of proportionality prescribes a 
much more structured approach to regulatory decisions than the Wednesbury doctrine.  
The nature of this test and its relation and comparison to EU law will not be examined further.  
 
2.3 Purpose of applying legal principles in international law 
There are several reasons as to why Courts choose to apply legal principles. One main reason 
is that principles may give important guidance in understanding legal provisions. Naturally, 
this is more relevant where the text of the provision in question is either silent or ambiguous. 
Legal texts are inherently incomplete and imprecise and this is an underlying problem when 
interpreting them.
22
 Even though principles may give the Courts valuable assistance in inter-
preting legal provisions, some scholars argue that the use of principles may ultimately involve 
abandonment of the rule of law.
23
 This shows the importance of applying principles in a criti-
cal manner.  
 
Another reason may be that courts wish to secure legitimacy for a decision. Harbo argues that 
courts apply principles of law in their premises in order to rationalize decision making.
24
 And 
that this is done “in an attempt to lend the decision some kind of neutrality, ie to secure that 
the decision is taken in an objective way, or at least give them the impression thereof.”25 Such 
rationalization may make decision making more efficient. This is mainly because courts then 
can “limit the scope of arguments that they have to consider when solving concrete cases of a 
particular kind.”26 
 
The decision-making can become more consistent and transparent if courts apply principles. 
However, if the principles are not applied in a coherent manner, this will lead to frustration 
for the Member States who will not be able to predict how the Court will apply the principle 
                                                 
21
 Sauter (2013) p. 4 
22
 Mitchell (2008) p. 13 
23
 Mitchell (2008) p. 22 
24
 Harbo, Tor-Inge, The Function of the Proportionality Principle in EU Law. In: European Law Journal, Vol-
ume 16:2 (2010), pp. 158-185. p. 160 
25
 Harbo (2010) p. 160 
26
 Harbo (2010) p. 161 
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in the case at issue. Principles may assist in identifying and balancing various interests affect-
ed by international trade.
27
   
 
Application of principles may contribute to a flexible system. No one could foresee all the 
different possible disputes or circumstances that could arise after implementation of the WTO 
Agreements or the EU Treaties. Furthermore, “drafters may have deliberately left matters 
open or ambiguous due to an absence of agreement”.28 
 
Even though general principles play a key role in interpreting legal provisions, it is not to say 
that they will automatically prevail over rules. Mitchell argues that WTO Tribunals should 
inspect a legal principle before using it in order to ensure that: “the principle has sufficient 
clarity and coherene to be of value; a concrete legal basis exists to validate the use of the prin-
ciple; and the principle is not being used to contradict the plain meaning of the text of the 
WTO agreements.”29 It could be argued that the EU Courts should apply a similar test before 
applying legal principles in EU law.  
 
 
 
                                                 
27
 Mitchell (2008) p. 3 
28
 Mitchell (2008) p. 15 
29
 Mitchell (2008) p. 22 
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3 Dispute settlement 
This section aims to give an overview over the dispute settlement systems in the two regimes. 
The dispute settlement systems have great importance for the effectiveness of provisions and 
legal principles. In both regimes, a trustee court has been delegated the task of enforcing trea-
ties.
30
 The dispute settlement bodies in both regimes have played a key and essential role in 
adopting the principle of proportionality. Both regimes have dispute settlement bodies that 
must be considered effective on an international scale.   
 
3.1 WTO 
In general, “the WTO agreements provide for many wide-ranging rules concerning interna-
tional trade”31. These rules may have major impact, economic and otherwise. This contributes 
to conflicting views on the correct interpretation and application by the Member States. 
Therefore, the WTO has a system to settle such disputes between Member States concerning 
their rights and obligations under the WTO agreements. 
 
3.1.1 Composition  
The WTO dispute settlement system was one of the most significant achievements of the 
Uruguay Round and is provided for in the Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing 
the Settlement of Disputes. The Agreement is more commonly referred to as the Dispute Set-
tlement Understanding or DSU. The DSU remedied a number of shortcomings in the former 
GATT dispute settlement system.  
 
The WTO dispute settlement system aims to “secure a positive solution to a dispute”.32In 
general, Members have limited access to the WTO dispute settlement system. A dispute arises 
if a Member States believes another Member State has violated an obligation or commitment 
it has made under the WTO legal framework. Members are required to seek consultations 
with the other Member or Members which they consider to be concerned before a panel is 
                                                 
30
 Sweet (2008) p. 46 
31
 Bossche, Peter Van den, The law and policy of the World Trade Organization: Text, cases and materials. 2nd 
ed. Cambridge, 2008. p. 169 
32
 DSU Article 3.7 
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established. The panel is an ad hoc body established for the purpose of adjudicating a particu-
lar dispute and consequently dissolves once their task is accomplished.
33
  
 
DSU Article 17.1 provides for the establishment of a standing Appellate Body, to whom 
Members can appeal decisions of a panel.  The WTO dispute settlement system is one of very 
few international dispute settlement mechanisms that provide for appellate review and has an 
appellate court.
34
 
 
3.1.2 Jurisdiction 
The WTO dispute settlement system has jurisdiction over any dispute between Members of 
the WTO if the dispute arises under the covered agreements.
35
 The jurisdiction of the WTO 
dispute settlement system is compulsory, exclusive and contentious. A further clarification of 
these concepts is; Firstly, a Member is obliged to bring any dispute arising under the covered 
agreements to the WTO dispute settlement system. Secondly, the WTO dispute settlement 
system excludes any other system, securing exclusivity of the WTO vis-á-vis other interna-
tional systems and consequently protecting the multilateral system from unilateral conduct.
36
 
Thirdly, the WTO dispute settlement system may only clarify WTO law in relation to an actu-
al dispute.  
 
3.1.3 Source of law 
After the WTO Agreement and its Annexes, the dispute settlement reports might be consid-
ered the second most important source of WTO law. By dispute settlement reports I refer to 
the reports of WTO panels and the Appellate Body. Reports of old GATT panels may also be 
considered as a source of WTO law. The above mentioned dispute settlement reports are in 
principle only binding on the parties to the particular dispute. However, the Appellate Body 
noted in Japan – Alcoholic Beverages II: 
“Adopted panel reports are an important part of the GATT acquis. They are often considered 
by subsequent panels. They create legitimate expectations among WTO Members, and, there-
                                                 
33
 Bossche (2008a) p. 209 
34
 Bossche (2008a) p. 231 
35
 DSU Article 1.1 
36
 Bossche (2008a) p. 180-181 
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fore, should be taken into account where they are relevant to any dispute.”37 Even though that 
case regarded prior GATT panel reports, the Appellate Body in US – Shrimp concluded that 
this reasoning also should apply to adopted Appellate Body Reports.
38
 Consequently, if the 
Appellate Body applies the principle of proportionality in one case, it will be relevant in sub-
sequent cases. 
 
3.2 EU 
The EU develops policy through regulations, directives and decisions. Naturally the system 
has a mechanism for testing the legality of such measures.  
 
3.2.1 Composition 
The judiciary powers of the European Union is managed by the Court of Justice of the Euro-
pean Union, hereinafter CJEU. Article 19(1) TEU provides that the CJEU shall include the 
Court of Justice, the General Court and specialized courts.
39
 Further, the CJEU shall “ensure 
that in the interpretation and application of the Treaties the law is observed”.40  
The CJEU is composed of one judge per Member State. 
 
The Court of Justice, hereinafter ECJ, is the highest court in the European Union in matters of 
European Union law. It has a heavy caseload, completing 701 cases in 2013.
 41
   
 
3.2.2 Jurisdiction 
There is a joint responsibility between national courts and the European Union Courts to in-
terpret and maintain EU law. The Court of Justice has an exclusive responsibility to declare 
EU measures invalid and to provide authoritative interpretations of EU law across the Union, 
                                                 
37
 WT/DS8/AB/R, WT/DS10/AB/R and WT/DS11/AB/R, Japan – Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages, AB-1996-2.p. 
14 
38
 WT/DS58/AB/R, United States – Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products, AB-1998-4.para. 
109 
39
 Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, Article 19 
40
 Ibid, Article 19 
41
 Court of Justice of the European Union, Annual Report 2013 p. 81 
12 
 
whilst national courts have a monopoly over the adjudication of disputes.
42
 The General Court 
has jurisdiction to hear specified action at first instance, unless the actions are brought by 
Member States, EU institutions or the European Central Bank, in which case the Court of Jus-
tice (ECJ) has sole jurisdiction.
43
 This follows from Article 51 of the Statute of the Court of 
Justice of the European Union, hereinafter the Statute.  
 
Decisions from the General Court can be appealed to the ECJ within two months. However, 
the appeal is limited to questions of law, which includes “lack of competence of the General 
Court, breach of procedure before it which adversely affects the interests of the appellant as 
well as the infringement of Union law by the General Court.
44
 There are a number of ways in 
which EU norms can be challenged, but the principal Treaty provision is article 263 TFEU 
(Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union). Article 263(1) allows the Court to review 
the legality of acts, other than recommendations and opinions, taken by the institutions listed 
in Article 263(1). This clearly covers regulations, decisions, and directives, which are listed in 
Article 288 TFEU. The ECJ has, however, held that this list is not exhaustive, and that other 
acts which are sui generis can also be reviewed, provided that they have binding force or pro-
duce legal effects
45
 The Union Courts have used the heads of review in Article 263 as the 
framework through which to develop general principles of law, which function as principles 
of administrative legality, drawing on concepts found within national legal systems. These 
include fundamental rights, proportionality, legitimate expectations, non-discrimination, 
transparency, and more recently the precautionary principle.
46
  
 
The EU principles serve a number of functions. They can be used as interpretative guides 
when construing Treaty provisions and EU legislation. Breach of a general principle of EU 
law can also serve as the ground for annulling an EU legislative, delegated, or implementing 
act. Breach of a general principle in the areas covered by EU law may in addition be the rea-
                                                 
42
 Chalmers, Damian, Gareth Trevor Davies and Giorgio Monti, European Union Law: cases and materials.  
2nd ed. Cambridge, 2010. P. 143 
43
 http://www.europarl.europa.eu/aboutparliament/en/displayFtu.html?ftuId=FTU_1.3.10.html 
44
 The Statute art. 58 
45
 Case C-57/95 France v Commission… 
46
 Craig (2011) p. 519 ii 
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son why a national rule is found to be in violation of EU law.
47
 Cases (for individuals) are 
first brought for the national courts. National courts may ask the ECJ for a preliminary ruling 
on the matter if in doubt of how to interpret the relevant EU provision.  
 
3.2.3 General principles 
In the name of preserving “the rule of law” the Court has developed principles of a constitu-
tional nature as part of EU law, which bind the EU institutions and Member States when they 
act within the sphere of EU law.
48
 It is the ECJ, as interpreter of the Treaties, which adjudi-
cates on the limits of EU competence as against the Member States.
49
  
 
Article 267 TFEU only gives the Court the power to give rulings on the Treaties and acts of 
the EU institutions, but the Court has consequently interpreted its power more broadly to in-
clude anything which forms part of the EU legal order. This applies even if it is neither a pro-
vision of the Treaties nor a piece of secondary legislation, be that international agreements to 
which the Union has succeeded the Member States or general principles of law and funda-
mental rights when there was no explicit reference to these in the Treaties.
50
 
 
A judgment given by the Court of Justice binds the referring national court.
51
 Even though 
there aren’t meaningful sanctions that could be applied if national courts do not follow rul-
ings, the national compliance is very high.
52
 This is natural, as the Member States are part of 
collaboration on European matters, and it is in their interest to follow the guidelines set by the 
EU courts. This contributes to a system which is predictable and easily understood.  
 
3.3 Special relation between WTO and EU law in dispute settlement 
The EU is considered a Member State of the WTO framework. The EU frequently uses the 
WTO dispute settlement system in order to contribute to the correction of violations of trade 
                                                 
47
 Craig (2011) p. 519 vi 
48
 Craig, Paul and Gráinne De Búrca, EU Law: texts, cases and materials. 5th ed. Oxford, 2011. P. 63 
49
 Craig (2011) p. 63 
50
 Chalmers (2010) p. 160 - 161 
51
 Chalmers (2010) p. 169 – with case reference 
52
 Chalmers (2010) p. 169 
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rules. Even though the EU is a WTO Member on its own, the same applies to the 28 Member 
States of the European Union. They are all WTO Members in their own right. The specific 
Member States of the European Union might be given reference on their own in the WTO 
framework if their national laws differ.  
15 
 
4 Proportionality in WTO law 
This chapter aims to illustrate relevant provisions and cases where the proportionality princi-
ple is visible in varying degrees. This chapter also illustrates the different balancing ap-
proaches and different wording.  
 
4.1 Debating on the principle of proportionality 
Whether or not proportionality is part of WTO law has been widely debated. Opinions on the 
matter vary to a large extent. Denying the existence of proportionality, Desmedt states that 
“there is no uniform proportionality principle in WTO law”53, after reviewing several WTO 
Agreements in detail. He further clarifies his opinion by stating: “In order for such a principle 
to apply in the WTO, one should expect Members to negotiate a rule, rather than wait for such 
a principle to emerge from dispute settlement cases in the WTO.”54 Opposite, Hilf argues that 
proportionality could be raised to a level where it is “one of the more basic principles underly-
ing the multilateral trading system”.55 He further clarifies that even though there is no explicit 
reference to the proportionality principle in WTO law “the basic idea of proportionality, i.e. 
the due balancing of competing rights, is reflected several times in WTO Agreements”.56 
Mitchell agrees with Hilf and states that “proportionality is reflected in various aspects of the 
WTO Agreements and is not simply something that is emerging from the decisions of WTO 
Tribunals”.57 Even though the views of Desmedt and Hilf are considered extreme in their re-
spective ways, there are many reviews of the principle of proportionality that lies in between 
these extreme positions. One example is Andenas and Zleptnig.
58
 
 
                                                 
53
 Desmedt (2001) p. 479 
54
 Desmedt (2001) p. 480 
55
 Hilf (2001) p. 120 
56
 Ibid, Hilf p. 120 
57
 Mitchell p. 191 
58
 Andenas (2007) 
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4.2 Conflicting values and interests 
According to the WTO Appellate Body Repertory of Reports and Awards 1995-2010
59
, a 
principle of proportionality was first recognized by the Appellate Body in US – Cotton Yarn 
where it stated “… the part of the total serious damage attributed to an exporting Member 
must be proportionate to the damage caused by the imports from that Member.”60 Although 
the case was in the context of remedies, this shows that proportionality influences the dispute 
settlement system of the WTO.  
 
The principle of proportionality and balancing competing interests will be most relevant when 
trade liberalization conflicts with other societal values and interests. These conflicts are rela-
tively frequent and the WTO framework therefore provides for a set of rules to reconcile trade 
liberalization with such values and interests. Some of the core societal values and interests are 
public health, consumer safety, the environment, employment, economic development and 
national security. Mitchell claims “The correct way to use proportionality as a principle for 
balancing competing interests in WTO disputes is not to import it as a substantive require-
ment of WTO law, but rather to apply it in interpreting particular language, such as “neces-
sary” or “least trade restrictive”, in the provisions of the WTO Agreements”.61  There is a 
wide range of exceptions that pursue the promotion and protection of other societal values and 
interests. In general, we distinguish between public policy exceptions and positive obliga-
tions. I will first go through the public policy exceptions of GATT article XX and GATS Ar-
ticle XIV in subsections 4.1.3 and 4.1.4 before I move over to the positive obligation in the 
SPS Agreement and the TBT Agreement in subsections 4.1.6 and 4.1.7.  
 
4.3 GATT article XX 
GATT article XX allows the member states a general permission to derogate from the provi-
sions of GATT. It is maybe most frequently invoked in relation to the two main principles of 
non-discrimination, namely Article I on the MFN treatment obligation and Article III on the 
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national treatment obligation. The application and scope of these Articles will not be dis-
cussed in further detail. GATT Article XX is invoked by a Member State only when a meas-
ure of that Member has been found to be inconsistent with any other GATT provision. Unless 
this is the case, article XX is not relevant. In other words, a Member invokes article XX in 
order to justify a GATT-inconsistent measure. To date, this provision has already touched 
upon some of the most sensitive issues of WTO law.
62
 
 
When determining whether a measure otherwise inconsistent with GATT obligations can be 
provisionally justified, Article XX sets out a two tier test. The Appellate Body clarified the 
application of this test in US – Gasoline: 
“In order that the justifying protection of Article XX may be extended to it, the measure at is-
sue must not only come under one or another of the particular exceptions – paragraphs (a) to 
(j) – listed under Article XX; it must also satisfy the requirements imposed by the opening 
clauses of Article XX. The analysis is, in other words, two-tiered: first, provisional justifica-
tion by reason of characterization of the measure under Article XX(g); second, further ap-
praisal of the same measure under the introductory clauses of Article XX.”63 
Following the steps set out in US – Gasoline, for a measure to be justified under Article XX, 
it must firstly fall under one of the subparagraphs in (a) to (j). Secondly the measure must be 
in conformity with the chapeau of Article XX. I will first go through the relevant subpara-
graphs in subsections 4.3.1 to 4.3.4 and then look at the chapeau in subsection 4.3.5.  
 
GATT article XX (a) to (j) set out specific grounds of justification for measures which would 
otherwise be inconsistent with provisions of the GATT. “These paragraphs reflect a propor-
tionality analysis, because they require an evaluation of the relationship between two compet-
ing interest – namely, the objective of trade liberalization and the protection of non-trade in-
terests”.64Article XX lists the reasons as to when the general exceptions may be applied. The 
most important include;  
(a) public morals 
(b) human, animal or plant life or health 
(d) compliance with laws or regulations 
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(g) exhaustible natural resources 
The other reasons are less frequently invoked and will not be reviewed in this thesis. This is 
not to say that the principle of proportionality is not relevant in relation to these. Letters (b), 
(d) and (g) are most frequently invoked, but there is some new case law on letter (a) that I 
believe can further illustrate the use of balancing acts in WTO.  
 
4.3.1 Article XX (b) 
This provision concerns measures that are “necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or 
health”. It sets out a two-tier test, requiring that a measure is designed for the stated purpose 
and that the measure is necessary to fulfill that policy objective. This approach was demon-
strated by in US – Gasoline65  and upheld in more recent cases66.  
 
The first element does not raise special difficulties in its interpretation. The requirement bears 
a close resemblance to the first test under the principle of proportionality, namely that the 
measure must be suitable.
67
 It is the second element of the test under Article XX(b) that gives 
rise to the major interpretative problems. The interpretation and application of the necessity 
requirement has evolved considerably over the years.
68
  
 
In Thailand – Cigarettes, the panel ruled that the measure at issue “could be considered to be 
“necessary” only if there were no alternative measure consistent with the General Agreement, 
or less inconsistent with it, which Thailand could reasonably be expected to employ…”.69  
The Panel came up with a number of less-restrictive-on-trade measures Thailand could have 
taken to achieve their goal and subsequently the measure was not deemed to be necessary.  
This adoption of the second element of the test as adopted by the Panel in Thailand - Ciga-
rettes bears a close resemblance to the second test of proportionality, namely necessity.
70
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The above mentioned approach and the case law of Article XX(b) “underwent a major 
change” in early 2001.71 The Appellate Body noted in EC – Asbestos regarding the necessity 
requirement: 
“one aspect of the ‘weighing and balancing process … comprehended in the determination of 
whether a WTO-consistent alternative measure’ is reasonably available is the extent to which 
the alternative measure ‘contributes to the realization of the end pursued’”.72 The Appellate 
Body was her referring to its ruling in Korea – Various Measures on Beef, which will be dis-
cussed in relation to Article XX(d).  
In EC – Asbestos, the Appellate Body also put forward a new requirement, different to the one 
in Thailand – Cigarettes by stating: 
“The remaining question, then, is whether there is an alternative measure that would achieve 
the same end and that is less restrictive of trade than a prohibition”.73  
 
It is also important to note that Member States have the right to choose their level of protec-
tion. This means that a “challenge of the necessity of a measure under Article XX is therefore 
limited to arguing that the measure at issue is not necessary to achieve that level of protec-
tion”.74  
 
In the more recent case, Brazil – Retreaded Tyres, the Appellate Body seems to confirm pre-
vious case law regarding the necessity requirement by stating: 
“We begin our analysis by recalling that, in order to determine whether a measure is “neces-
sary” within the meaning of Article XX (b) of the GATT 1994, a panel must consider the rele-
vant factors, particularly the importance of the interests or values at stake, the extent of the 
contribution to the achievement of the measure’s objective and its trade restrictiveness. If this 
analysis yields a preliminary conclusion that the measure is necessary, this result must be con-
firmed by comparing the measure with possible alternatives, which may be less trade restric-
tive while providing an equivalent contribution to the achievement of the objective. This com-
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parison should be carried out in the light of the importance of the interests or values at stake. It 
is through this process that a panel determines whether a measure is necessary.”75 
However, the Appellate Body further noted:  
“…the fundamental principle is the right that WTO Members have to determine the level of 
protection that they consider appropriate in a given context. Another key element of the analy-
sis of the necessity of a measure under Article XX(b) is the contribution it brings to the 
achievement of its objective. A contribution exists when there is a genuine relationship of 
ends and means between the objective pursued and the measure at issue. To be characterized 
as necessary, a measure does not have to be indispensable. However, its contribution to the 
achievement of the objective must be material, not merely marginal or insignificant, especially 
if the measure at issue is as trade restrictive as an import ban.”76 
Bossche points out that the Appellate Body seems to “introduce a proportionality stricto sensu 
assessment”77. However, he concludes by stating “I doubt whether this was what the Appel-
late Body in Brazil – Retreaded Tyres intended but future case law will have to clarify this 
issue.”78 
 
A more recent case is China – Raw Materials. The Panel concluded that China had not 
demonstrated that the export restrictions at issue were “necessary” within the meaning of Ar-
ticle XX(b). This decision was not appealed by China. The Appellate Body follows the same 
procedure as above, but has not clarified whether a proportionality stricto sensu assessment is 
applied in relation to Article XX(b). 
 
4.3.2 Article XX (d) 
Article XX(d) concerns measures that are “necessary to secure compliance with laws or regu-
lations which are not inconsistent with the provisions of this Agreement …”79 As with Article 
XX(b), Article XX(d) also sets out a two-tier test to determine whether the measure at issue 
can be provisionally justified. With regard to the first element, the Appellate Body held in 
Korea  - Various Measures on Beef:  
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“the measure must be one designed to ‘secure compliance’ with laws or regulations”.80 It must 
be clear that the requirement that a measure must be “designed” to secure compliance with 
laws or regulation is similar to the test of the first element of the test under Article XX(b). It 
similarly bears close resemblance to the first step of proportionality, suitability.  
 
Regarding the necessity requirement, the Panel in US – Section 33781 applied the least restric-
tive test which was mentioned above in relation to Article XX(b) in Thailand – Cigarettes.  
 
The necessity requirement in Article XX(d) as interpreted and clarified by the Appellate Body 
in Korea – Various Measures on Beef has been applied by several Panels since.82 “In sum, 
determination of whether a measure, which is not “indispensable”, may nevertheless be “nec-
essary” within the contemplation of Article XX(d), involves in every case a process of weigh-
ing and balancing a series of factors which prominently include the contribution made by the 
compliance measure to the enforcement of the law or regulation at issue, the importance of 
the common interests or values protected by that law or regulation, and the accompanying 
impact of the law or regulation on imports or exports.”83 This shows that there is a process 
weighing and balancing in order to determine if a measure is necessary within the meaning of 
Article XX(d). Bossche notes that the “weighing and balancing provided for  by the Appellate 
Body in Korea – Various Measures on Beef does not take place after the necessity of the 
measure at issue has been established (…) but during the examination of the necessity of the 
measure.”84 Therefore, even though the weighing and balancing of the factors seem to bear 
some resemblance with the proportionality stricto sensu test, it cannot be considered a mani-
festation of such a test.  
 
The balancing to evaluate if a measure is necessary “is comprehended in the determination of 
whether a WTO-consistent alternative measure which the Member concerned could “reasona-
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bly be expected to employ” is available, or whether a less WTO-inconsistent measure is “rea-
sonably available”. 85 
 
China –Raw Materials is an example of recent case law regarding the necessity requirement 
of article XX (d) and (b). The panel concluded that China had not demonstrated that the ex-
port restrictions at issue were necessary within the meaning of Article XX (d). This finding 
was not appealed by China to the Appellate Body.   
 
4.3.3 Article XX (g) 
Article XX (g) concerns measures relating to the conservation of exhaustible natural re-
sources. The provision is together with Article XX (b) seen to have fundamental importance 
because it departs from core GATT rules on environmental protection purposes.
86
 For a 
measure to be justified under Article XX (g) it must fulfill a three-tier test, focusing on firstly, 
conservation of exhaustible natural resources. Secondly, the requirement that the measure is 
relating to the first requirement. This is the test that is interesting in a balancing perspective. 
And thirdly that it be made effective in conjunction with restrictions on domestic production 
or consumption.  
 
The GATT Panel in Canada – Herring and Salmon observed that “Article XX (g) does not 
state how the trade measures are to be related to the conservation…”. This consequently 
raised the question on whether any relationship would be sufficient or if a particular relation-
ship was required. The Panel concluded that measures did not have to be necessary or essen-
tial to the conservation of an exhaustible natural resource, but it had to be primarily aimed at 
this objective to be considered as “relating to” conservation within the meaning of Article XX 
(g). This assessment was further upheld in US – Gasoline. Andenæs: clarified to require at 
last a substantial relationship.
87
 
 
The Appellate Body in US – Shrimp clarified its understanding of “relating to” the conserva-
tion of exhaustible natural resources to require a “close and real relationship” between the 
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measure and the policy objective. A measure may not be disproportionately wide in its scope 
or reach in relation to the policy objective pursued.
88
 
 
In China – Raw Materials, the Appellate Body referred to its report in US – Shrimp and not-
ed: “In order to fall within the ambit of subparagraph (g) of Article XX, a measure must “re-
late to the conservation of exhaustible natural resources”. The term “relate to” is defined as 
“having some connection with, being connected to”. The Appellate Body has found that, for a 
measure to relate to conservation in the sense of Article XX(g), there must be “a close and 
genuine relationship of ends and means”.89 
 
It is easier for a measure to be justified following the related to test rather than the necessity 
test under XX (b) or (d).  
 
4.3.4 Article XX (a) 
There is limited WTO case law regarding this provision. Article XX (a) was interpreted and 
applied by the Panel in China – Publications and Audiovisual Products. The case concerned 
restrictions on trading and distribution of publications and audiovisual products in China. 
China invoked Article XX (a) to justify otherwise GATT-inconsistent restrictions on trading 
and distribution of publications and audiovisual products. China’s core argument was that the 
restrictions could be justified under Article XX (a) because “the system of selecting importa-
tion entities undertaking content review is, as a whole, necessary to protect public morals”.90 
The Appellate Body upheld the Panel’s findings that the measures at issue were not necessary 
to protect public morals.
91
  
 
The examination of the necessity requirement was very much in line with WTO case law on 
the necessity requirement of Article XX (b) and (d). The same review and comments of the 
proportionality test on suitability and necessity can be said to apply to this provision. 
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4.3.5 Chapeau of Article XX 
If the measure at question can be justified of one of the subsections in article XX (a) to (j), it 
must further be examined whether it satisfies the requirement of the chapeau of article XX. 
This is referred to above as the two-tier test of Article XX
92
 and determines whether a meas-
ure, “in its concrete application, is lawful under Article XX as a whole”93. The two-tiered way 
of determining whether a measure can be justified under was a result of the provision’s fun-
damental and logical structure.
94
 
 
The chapeau reads: 
 “Subject to the requirement that such measures are not applied in a manner which would con-
stitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination between countries where the same 
conditions prevail, or a disguised restriction on international trade, nothing in this Agreement 
shall be construed to prevent the adoption or enforcement by any contracting party of 
measures…” 
In short, the object and purpose of the chapeau of Article XX is to avoid that provisionally 
justified measures are applied in such a way as would constitute a misuse or an abuse of the 
exceptions of Article XX.
95
 In US – Shrimp the Appellate Body stated that the Chapeau “em-
bodies the recognition on the part of the WTO Members of the need to maintain a balance of 
rights and obligations between the right of a Member to invoke one or another of the excep-
tions of Article XX … on the one hand, and the substantive rights of the other Members under 
the GATT 1994, on the other hand.”96 According to the Appellate Body, there must be bal-
ance between the right of a Member to invoke an exception under Article XX and the substan-
tive rights of the other Members under the GATT 1994. In US – Shrimp, the Appellate Body 
held: 
“In our view, the language of the chapeau makes clear that each of the exceptions in para-
graphs (a) to (j) of Article XX is a limited and conditional exception from the substantive ob-
ligations contained in the other provisions of the GATT 1994, that is to say, the ultimate avail-
                                                 
92
 See section 4.3 
93
 Andenas (2007) p. 410 
94
 US – Shrimp para. 119 
95
 Bossche p. 642, Brazil – Retreaded Tyres para. 215.  
96
 US – Shrimp para. 156 
25 
 
ability of the exception is subject to the compliance by the invoking Member with the re-
quirements of the chapeau”.97   
It further held: 
“The task of interpreting and applying the chapeau is, hence, essentially the delicate one of lo-
cating and marking out a line of equilibrium between the right of a Member to invoke an ex-
ception under Article XX and the rights of the other Members under varying substantive pro-
visions (e.g., Article XI) of the GATT 1994, so that neither of the competing rights will cancel 
out the other and thereby distort and nullify or impair the balance of rights and obligations 
construed by the Members themselves in that Agreement. The location of the line of equilibri-
um, as expressed in the chapeau, is not fixed and unchanging; the line moves as the kind and 
the shape of the measure at stake vary and as the facts making up specific cases differ”.98  
 
Bossche claims the interpretation and application of the chapeau in a particular case is a 
search for the appropriate line of equilibrium between the right of Members to adopt and 
maintain trade-restrictive legislation and measures that pursue certain legitimate societal val-
ues or interests and the right of other Members to trade.
99
 This can be seen as an expression of 
a balancing act in the WTO framework. In searching for the balance, one must consider the 
requirements set out in the chapeau that the application of such a measure may not constitute 
either “arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination between countries where the same conditions 
prevail or a disguised restriction on international trade. Following this, the chapeau does not 
prohibit all kinds of discrimination. The decisive factor I whether the discrimination can be 
considered arbitrary or unjustifiable. The chapeau is a balancing process which will ultimately 
determine whether a discriminatory measure is arbitrary or unjustifiable, or constitutes a dis-
guised restriction on international trade.
100
 
 
Mitchell argues that “the chapeau of Article XX can also be seen as embodying elements of a 
proportionality analysis, although the language used is less clearly linked to the general prin-
ciple of proportionality”.101 
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4.3.5.1 Arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination 
In US – Shrimp, The Appellate Body found that three elements must exist for “arbitrary or 
unjustifiable discrimination” to be established. Firstly, the measure at issue must result in dis-
crimination. Secondly, such discrimination must be arbitrary or unjustifiable. Thirdly, the 
arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination must occur between countries where the same condi-
tions prevail.
102
  
 
4.3.5.2 Disguised Restriction on International Trade 
The Appellate Body stated in US – Gasoline: 
“Arbitrary discrimination, unjustifiable discrimination and disguised restriction on interna-
tional trade may, accordingly, be read side-by-side; they impart meaning to one another.”103  
There is a close relationship between disguised restriction on international trade and arbitrary 
or unjustifiable discrimination. This is illustrated in US – Gasoline: 
“the kinds of considerations pertinent in deciding whether the application of a particular 
measure amounts to “arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination”, may also be taken into account 
in determining the presence of a “disguised restriction” on international trade. The fundamen-
tal theme is to be found in the purpose and object of avoiding abuse or illegitimate use of the 
exceptions to substantive rules available in Article XX.”104 
 
4.4 GATS article XIV 
Similar to the GATT article XX, the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) Article 
XIV, provides for a general exceptions provision. This allows Members to deviate from obli-
gations and commitments under the GATS if certain conditions are met. Even though GATT 
Article XX and GATS article XIV are somewhat alike, there are also important differences. A 
big difference is the difference in justifications reasons in the two provisions. Nevertheless, 
“Article XX of the GATT and its jurisprudence provide us with a basis to interpret Article 
XIV of the GATS”.105 
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4.4.1 Article XIV(a) 
In US – Gambling, the Appellate Body reviewed whether a US prohibition on internet gam-
bling could be justified under Article XIV(a) which states that a measure must be “necessary 
to protect public morals or to maintain public order. The Appellate Body held: 
“Article XIV of the GATS sets out the general exceptions from obligations under that Agree-
ment in the same manner as does Article XX of the GATT 1994.” Further: 
“Similar language is used in both provisions, notably the term “necessary” and the require-
ments set out in their respective chapeaux. Accordingly, like the Panel, we find previous deci-
sions under Article XX of the GATT 1994 relevant for our analysis under Article XIV of the 
GATS”. 106 
 
Since the test is similar under GATS Article XIV and GATT Article XX, I will not comment 
further on the balancing test under this sub-paragraph.  
 
4.5 Common elements of GATT Article XX and GATS Article XIV 
The specified paragraphs of Article XX use different standards, for example “necessary and 
“relating to”. The Appellate Body in US – Gasoline stated with regard to the different terms 
used in Article XX: 
“In enumerating the various categories of governmental acts, laws or regulations which WTO 
Members may carry out or promulgate in pursuit of differing legitimate state policies or inter-
ests outside the realm of trade liberalization, Article XX uses different terms in respect of dif-
ferent categories. … It does not seem reasonable to suppose that the WTO Members intended 
to require, in respect of each and every category, the same kind of degree of connection or re-
lationship between the measure under appraisal and the state interest or policy sought to be 
promoted or realized.”107 
This shows that each measure must be considered in relation to the provision at issue.  
 
The debate on proportionality in WTO law changed significantly in 2001 as a result of the 
Reports of the Appellate Body in Korea – Various Measures on Beef and EC – Asbestos and 
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more recently, changed again, as a result of the Reports of the Appellate Body in US - Gam-
bling and Brazil – Retreaded Tyres. The precise implications of this evolving case law for the 
principle of proportionality are, however, not necessarily clear and certainly not beyond dis-
cussion.
108
 
 
In general, it is easier for a measure to fulfill the relating to requirement of Article XX(g) than 
the necessity requirement of Article XX(b) or (d).  
 
4.6 TBT Agreement 
The Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT Agreement) and the GATT 1994 are not 
mutually exclusive. The Panel in the EC – Asbestos case clearly states that both could be ex-
amined if they both appear to apply to a given measure in a case.
109
 The Panel clarified that it 
should firstly be examined whether the measure is consistent with the TBT Agreement. This 
is due to that the TBT Agreement deals specifically and in detail with technical barriers to 
trade. If the measure is found to be consistent with the TBT Agreement, the Panel stated that 
it must still examine whether the measure is also consistent with the GATT 1994. This ap-
proach has been upheld by Panels and the Appellate Body since.
110
 This is also clear from the 
General Interpretative Note to Annex 1A of the WTO Agreement, which clearly states that the 
TBT Agreement would prevail.
111
  
 
The analysis in this section focuses on Article 2.2. Mitchell claims the TBT Agreement gives 
WTO Tribunals the greatest scope to use the general principle of proportionality.
112
 This is 
due to Article 2.2, which requires WTO Tribunals to scrutinize whether a Member’s objective 
is legitimate and also whether the chosen measure is suitable and necessary to achieve the 
objective.
113
 Article 2.2 of the TBT Agreement reads:  
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“Members shall ensure that technical regulations are not prepared, adopted or applied with a 
view to or with the effect of creating unnecessary obstacles to international trade”. Further: 
“technical regulations shall not be more trade-restrictive than necessary to fulfill a legitimate 
objective, taking account of the risks non-fulfillment would create”.  It must be clear from the 
text of Article 2.2, it is not the measure, but the trade-restrictiveness of the measure which is 
assessed for necessity.
114
 Legitimate objectives that may justify the creation of a trade obsta-
cle in the form of a technical regulation are listed in article 2.2 and include: 
- National security 
- The prevention of deceptive practices 
- The protection of human health and safety, animal or plant life or health 
- The protection of the environment 
It should be noted that this list is not exhaustive as indicated by the words inter alia in the in-
troduction of the list. It will be up to panels and the Appellate Body to assess whether policy 
objectives other than those listed, such as animal welfare or fair labor practices, are, in a par-
ticular case, legitimate policy objectives within the meaning of article 2.2.
115
  
 
Even though a measure is justified under article 2.2 as necessary to fulfil a legitimate policy 
objective, it may not remain justified in the future. Article 2.3 calls for a continuous valuation 
of whether the measure can be justified under article 2.2: “Technical regulations shall not be 
maintained if the circumstances or objectives giving rise to their adoption no longer exist or if 
the changed circumstances or objectives can be addressed in a less trade-restrictive manner”. 
Bossche says this could be seen as an “elaboration” of the necessity test of article 2.2.116 
 
US - COOL
117
 - The Panel found that the US measure requiring mandatory country of origin 
labeling was inconsistent with Articles 2.1 and 2.2. The Appellate Body reversed the Panel’s 
finding that the COOL measure violates Article 2.2.  The Appellate Body found that Article 
2.2 does not impose a minimum threshold level at which the measure must fulfil its legitimate 
objective.  
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“To date, there is no case law on the assessment of necessity under the TBT Agreement.”118 
However, in line with case law on the assessment of necessity under Article XX(b) and (d) of 
the GATT 1994, it is to be expected that the assessment of necessity under the TBT Agree-
ment will also involve a process of weighing and balancing the above-mentioned and other 
factors and elements.  
 
4.7 SPS Agreement  
The Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures (SPS Agreement) 
“applies to all sanitary and phytosanitary measures which may, directly or indirectly, affect 
international trade”.119 SPS measures often take the form of technical barriers to trade120, but 
are subject to a different set of WTO rules.
121
 SPS measures are frequently adopted to protect 
humans, plants or animals in their territories from food-safety risks or risks from pests or dis-
eases.
122
 Bossche claims that “the rules contained in the SPS Agreement reflect an attempt to 
balance the sometimes conflicting interests of the protection of health against SPS risks and 
the liberalization of trade in food and agricultural products”.123 The basic principles of the 
SPS Agreement “reflect the underlying aim of balancing the need to increase market access 
for food and agricultural products, on the one hand, with the recognition of the sovereign right 
of governments to take measures to protect human, animal and plant life and health in their 
territories, on the other. These basic principles and their connection to the principle of propor-
tionality will be reviewed below. 
 
4.7.1 Article 2.2 and 5.6 
Article 2.1 expressly recognizes that Members can take SPS measures. However, Article 2.2 
limits this right by the requirement that: “Members shall ensure that any sanitary or 
phytosanitary measure is applied only to the extent necessary to protect human, animal or 
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plant life or death”124. The necessity requirement in Article 2.2 has not yet been subject to 
interpretation in dispute settlement. As this requirement is made more specific in other provi-
sions of the SPS Agreement, Members prefer to challenge SPS measures under these more 
specific provisions (ex. Article 5.6).
125
 It is similar to the necessity requirement in GATT Ar-
ticle XX(b) and (d). If it is invoked, it is natural to assume that the interpretation of these pro-
visions will play a key role in interpreting the necessity requirement of Article 2.2 of the SPS 
Agreement. There has however, been cases regarding the requirement of scientific evidence 
under Article 2.2.
126
  
 
Article 5.6 refines the necessary-obligation set out in article 2.2.
127
 It requires Members to 
ensure that SPS measures “are not more trade-restrictive than required to achieve their ap-
propriate level of … protection, taking into account technical and economic feasibility”.128 
Footnote 3 of the SPS Agreement further elaborates on the requirement set out in article 5.6. 
It provides: “a measure is not more trade-restrictive than required unless there is another 
measure, reasonably available taking into account technical and economic feasibility, that 
achieves the appropriate level of sanitary or phytosanitary protection and is significantly less 
restrictive to trade”. This clearly mirrors the necessity test of EU law, which requires that the 
least restrictive means be used.
129
 
 
The Appellate Body in Japan – Apples130 acknowledged the relevance of the proportionality 
principle in relation to Article 2.2 and Footnote 3. The Appellate Body upheld the Panel’s 
findings that “a measure is maintained “without sufficient scientific evidence” within the 
meaning of Article 2.2 of the SPS Agreement if there is no “rational or objective relationship” 
between the measure and the relevant scientific evidence. Given the negligible risk identified 
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on the basis of the scientific evidence and the nature of the elements composing the measure, 
the Panel concluded that Japan’s measure is “clearly disproportionate” to that risk”.131 
 
US - Poultry
132
 - The measure was found inconsistent with Article 2.2 because it was main-
tained without sufficient scientific evidence. The Panel’s report was adopted by the DSB. 
There was not an appeal to the Appellate Body. Since the measure was not justified under the 
SPS Agreement, it was also found to be inconsistent with Article XX (b) of the GATT. This 
demonstrates the relationship between the SPS Agreement and the GATT.  
 
US – Salmon - Application of the necessity test, relying on Footnote 3. The Appellate Body 
held: “the footnote to this provision clearly provides a three-pronged test to establish a viola-
tion of Article 5.6. As already noted, the three elements of this test under Article 5.6 are that 
there is an SPS measure which: 
(1) is reasonably available taking into account technical and economic feasibility; 
(2) achieves the Member’s appropriate level of sanitary or phytosanitary protection; and 
(3) is significantly less trade restrictive to trade than the SPS measure contested.”133 
 
4.8 Conclusions on the positive obligations 
In general, “the SPS and TBT Agreements lay down positive normative standards for trade 
restrictive measures that go beyond the principle of non-discrimination and also apply to non-
discriminatory domestic regulation”.134  
 
In both the TBT and the SPS Agreement domestic measures must pursue an accepted public 
policy objective. Further on, the measure must be no more trade-restrictive than necessary. 
Andenæs holds that “this determination is governed and influenced by a balancing and weigh-
ing process aiming to ensure that the obstacles to international trade are not disproportionate 
or excessive to the objectives pursued by the Members”.135 
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5 Proportionality in EU law 
In the previous chapter I assessed how the principle of proportionality has been applied in 
WTO law. This chapter gives a review of the application of the principle of proportionality in 
EU law, mainly by referring to relevant case law. 
 
5.1 Article 5 TEU 
The principle of proportionality is recognized in Article 5 TEU which states in paragraph 1 
that: “The use of Union competences is governed by the principles of subsidiarity and propor-
tionality”. Further, in paragraph 4: “Under the principle of proportionality, the content and 
form of Union action shall not exceed what is necessary to achieve the objectives of the Trea-
ties”. Before moving on to the principle of proportionality as developed by the ECJ, I find 
reason to comment on article 5 TEU and the proportionality protocol.  
 
Article 5 TEU should not be considered as a codification of case law mentioned below in sec-
tion… It should rather be seen “as the addition of a procedural test in the legislative con-
text”.136 It can further be argued that “its likely impact appears limited or at least secondary to 
that of the principle of subsidiarity”. This understanding is supported by Protocol no. 2 to the 
EC Treaty which deals with the application of the principles of subsidiarity and proportionali-
ty.  
 
Following the aim and objective of this thesis, it is not necessary to further elaborate on Arti-
cle 5 TEU. I therefore move on to the application of the principle of proportionality by the 
ECJ.  
 
5.2 Disparate views 
There are disparate views on the application of the principle of proportionality in EU law.  
In one end, Harbo argues that the principle of proportionality “has no clear or fixed substan-
tial meaning”.137 He further questions “whether the court, although claiming to do so, is really 
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applying the principle of proportionality in the first place”.138 Another extreme is Schwarze, 
who claims that the principle of proportionality is the most important general principle of EU 
economic law. Other views lie between these extreme opinions, holding that the principle of 
proportionality is a principle of EU law, but that its application is varied.
139
 
 
5.3 Proportionality test 
In any proportionality inquiry the relevant interests must be identified, and there will be some 
ascription of weight or value to those interests, since this is a necessary condition precedent to 
any balancing operation.
140
 The ECJ has developed a rich body of jurisprudence on general 
principles of law, hereunder the principle of proportionality.
141
 The meaning of the word 
“general” refers according to Emiliou to the fact that the respective principle of law is inher-
ent in a series of infinite applications of the law.
142
 It can also be argued that the principle 
should have some universal meaning. This might be illustrated by the fact that the general 
principle is also present in other national or international systems of law.
143
 Together with 
supremacy, direct effect and state liability, proportionality is one of the core general principles 
of EU law. However, the former three principles were derived from the EU legal order itself 
whereas in the EU, context proportionality has been derived from the laws of the Member 
States.
144
 There is no doubt that the European Union recognizes general principles in the Un-
ions’ law. Take for example TEU Article 6 paragraph 3 that reads: “Fundamental rights, as 
guaranteed by the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms and as they result from the constitutional traditions common to the Member States, 
shall constitute general principles of the Union's law.” This clearly shows that the EU recog-
nizes fundamental rights as guaranteed by the ECHR
145
 as general principles of the Union’s 
law. The principle was first adopted by the Court, and was later codified into Article 6 
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TEU.
146
 Another example of a principle that was developed and adopted over time by the 
Court is the principal of gender equality and prohibition against gender discrimination. Today, 
it is codified in the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union. 
 
General principles must be respected both internally in EU institutions, but also by the Mem-
ber States’ national law within the EU area. National law regarding areas of law outside the 
EU context does naturally not have to comply with general principles recognized in EU law, 
unless of course, the same principle is recognized under national law. De Burca claims the 
Court of Justice has applied the proportionality principle in a wide spectrum of ways, ranging 
from a very deferential approach, to quite a rigorous and searching examination of the justifi-
cation for a measure which has been challenged.
147
 
 
The Internationale Handelsgesellschaft
148
 case is often mentioned as the starting point of the 
proportionality principle in EU law.
149
 The Court held:  
“It therefore appears that the requirement of import and export licences involving for the li-
censees an undertaking to effect the proposed transactions under the guarantee of a deposit 
constitutes a method which is both necessary and appropriate to enable the competent authori-
ties to determine in the most effective manner their interventions on the market in cereals. The 
principle of the system of deposits cannot therefore be disputed”150  
Even though there is no explicit reference to the principle of proportionality, the relevance of 
the case is undisputed. In the same case it was also confirmed that fundamental rights were to 
be considered principles of EU law when the Court stated:  
“In fact, respect for fundamental rights forms an integral part of the general principles of law 
protected by the Court of Justice. The protection of such rights, whilst inspired by the consti-
tutional traditions common to the Member States, must be ensured within the framework of 
the structure and objectives of the Community.”151  
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As mentioned in chapter two, subsection 2.2, the proportionality test for the EU level consists 
of three elements, suitability, necessity and proportionality in stricto sensu. All three steps 
must be fulfilled in order for a measure to be proportionate. In other words, the three elements 
of the test are cumulative.
152
 If one step fail to be fulfilled, it is not possible for the other ele-
ments to be fulfilled. The ECJ starts with the first requirement. Due to the cumulative nature 
of the test, the ECJ less often reaches the final requirement, proportionality stricto sensu.  
 
The steps mentioned above were set out clearly in Fedesa
153
 (1990), regarding a European 
directive which prohibited the use of certain hormonal substances in livestock farming.  
“The Court has consistently held that the principle of proportionality is one of the general 
principles of Community law. By virtue of that principle, the lawfulness of the prohibition of 
an economic activity is subject to the condition that the prohibitory measures are appropriate 
and necessary in order to achieve the objectives legitimately pursued by the legislation in 
question; when there is a choice between several appropriate measures recourse must be had 
to the least onerous, and the disadvantages caused must not be disproportionate to the aims 
pursued.”154 “Whereas in the suitability and necessity test there are clear traces of some guide-
line according to which the courts make the assessment, it is (even) more difficult to deter-
mine the exact content of the stricto sensu test.”155 
 
Proportionality can be used to challenge EU actions and Member State actions that fall within 
the sphere of EU law.
156
 The former will be examined in subsection 5.5 and the latter in sub-
section 5.6. In general, “different considerations tend to apply in these two spheres”157, which 
will be illustrated below. The nature of the proportionality test involved differs significantly, 
with the EU usually being subject to a manifestly disproportionate test and the Member States 
to (modified versions of) a least restrictive means test.
158
 Both with regard to the EU and re-
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garding the Member States the degree to which the relevant policies have been centralized 
plays a role in determining the standard of review. An example is where the Member States 
invoke national public policy exceptions to principles of EU law such as the market freedoms. 
The degree to which this is possible depends inter alia on the degree of harmonization that has 
been achieved. Likewise the strictness of the test to which EU measures are subjected depends 
in part on whether common policies are involved.
159
 
 
5.4 Review of acts from the EU institutions 
The principle of proportionality is essential in reviewing legal acts from EU institutions.  
Craig highlights three categories of cases in which the principle of proportionality has been 
applied to acts from EU institutions, namely “cases involving discretionary policy choices, 
whether societal, political or economic in nature; cases concerned with the infringement of a 
right recognized by EU law; and cases involving a disproportionate penalty or financial bur-
den.”160 The first two categories will be used to go through some of the most relevant case 
law in relation to the proportionality principle when reviewing acts of the EU institutions. The 
latter category will not be examined in further detail.  
 
5.4.1 Discretionary policy choices 
Under this type of case, proportionality is used to challenge a discretionary policy choice 
made by the administration. The guiding principle was developed in British American Tobac-
co
161
: “Consequently, the legality of a measure adopted in that sphere can be affected only if 
the measure is manifestly inappropriate having regard to the objective which the competent 
institution is seeking to pursue”.162 In other words, the measure of review will be deemed ap-
propriate whenever the EU legislature exercises a broad discretion involving political, eco-
nomic, or social choices requiring it to make complex assessments.
163
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Several cases where proportionality is challenged have arisen in relation to measures adopted 
under the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP). One example is Fedesa
164
 where the Council 
adopted a directive which prohibited the use of certain hormones in livestock farming. The 
applicants argued that the directive infringed on the principle of proportionality and subse-
quently challenged the validity of national legislation that implemented the directive. The 
applicants argued both that the measure was not suitable and that it was not necessary for the 
pursued objective. Given a choice between several appropriate measures, the ECJ continued: 
“However with regard to judicial review of compliance with those conditions it must be stated 
that in matters concerning the common agricultural policy the Community legislature has a 
discretionary power which corresponds to the political responsibilities given to it by … the 
Treaty. Consequently, the legality of a measure adopted in that sphere can be affected only if 
the measure is manifestly inappropriate having regard to the objective which the competent 
institution is seeking to pursue”.165 The reasoning in Fedesa has been applied in several other 
cases.  
 
5.4.2 Rights recognized by EU law 
These claims are made on the basis of rights enshrined in the Treaties or EU legislation. Craig 
holds that “the ECJ will tend to construe limits to such rights strictly, with the consequence 
that there will be a searching inquiry into the suitability and necessity elements of proportion-
ality”.166 This is exemplified by Hautala.167 In this case, Hautala wanted access to a report on 
conventional arms export from the Council. The Council denied her access and she therefore 
brought the case in for the Court of First Instance (now, the General Court). The court an-
nulled the Council’s decision to refuse her access to the document because the Council had 
failed to consider the possibility of partial access to the report. Ruling from CFI: 
“The exceptions provided for in Article 4(1) of Decision 93/731 on public access to Council 
documents must be interpreted in the light of the principle of the right to information and the 
principle of proportionality. It follows that, before refusing access to a document uncondition-
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ally, the Council is obliged to examine whether partial access should be granted, that is to say, 
access to the information not covered by the exceptions”. 
Further, “Secondly, as regards the principle of proportionality, the aim of protecting the pub-
lic interest with regard to international relations may be achieved even if the Council does no 
more than remove, after examination, the passages in the contested report which might harm 
international relations”. The case was appealed to the ECJ, which upheld the ruling from the 
Court of First Instance and clarified the role of the proportionality principle. The ECJ held: 
“The principle of proportionality requires that derogations remain within the limits of what is 
appropriate and necessary for achieving the aim in view.” Further: “In the absence of any rea-
son to show why an institution should be able to keep secret the items of information in a 
document which are not covered by the exceptions laid down in Article 4(1) of Decision 
97/731, a refusal to grant partial access would be manifestly disproportionate for ensuring the 
confidentiality of the items of information covered by one of those exceptions. The aim pur-
sued by the Council in refusing access to the contested report could be achieved even if the 
Council did no more than remove, after examination, the passages in the report which might 
harm international relations”. This clearly shows that the ECJ meant that the CFI’s application 
of the proportionality principle could be justified. 
 
In Hauer
168
 the applicant challenged a Community Regulation that limited the planting of 
new wines. The case concerned a Community administrative measure which infringed on the 
right to property. This illustrates the connection between common policies, proportionality 
and rights. Although the idea of “common constitutional traditions” as a foundation for the 
general principles of EU law is an attractive one in principle, it is unquestionably true that the 
differences between specific national conceptions of particular human rights are often great. 
Thus, even if the ECJ accepts the argument of a particular party that a given right should be 
recognized as part of EU law, the way in which the Court determines the legal scope of that 
right and the permissible restrictions upon it in the context of the case at hand may well differ 
from the way it would be applied in a national context, as seen in Hauer and Internationale 
Handelsgesellschaft.
169
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In Kadi, The applicant argued that the Regulation constituted a disproportionate infringement 
of his property rights. The ECJ reiterated its normal approach and held that property rights 
were not absolute and hence could be restricted, provided that the restrictions corresponded to 
objectives of Community public interest and did not constitute a disproportionate and intoler-
able interference, impairing the very substance of the right so guaranteed. 
170
 
This case might be considered to be in contrast with Hauer.   
 
5.5 Review of measures taken by Member States 
If EU courts find that a Member State action infringes one of the four freedoms concerning 
goods, workers, establishment, and the provision of service and capital, the Member State 
must try to justify the infringement by the relevant Treaty article.
171
 One example of such a 
Treaty article is Article 36 TFEU which states: 
“The provisions of Article 34 and 35 shall not preclude prohibitions or restrictions on imports, 
exports or goods in transit justified on grounds of public morality, public policy or public se-
curity; the protection of health and life of humans, animals or plants; the protection of national 
treasures possessing artistic, historic or archaeological value; or the protection of industrial 
and commercial property. Such prohibitions or restrictions shall not, however, constitute a 
means of arbitrary discrimination or a disguised restriction on trade between Member 
States.”172 
In addition, the Member State action must comply with the principle of proportionality. Even 
though this is not explicitly mentioned in the provision of the Treaty, “the ECJ has demanded 
that the challenged measure must be the least trade restrictive possible to attain the end in 
view.”173 In relation to free movement of services, Article 56 TFEU prohibits restrictions on 
the provision of services between Member States. The Court of Justice applies Article 56 to 
any measure which makes access to the service market of a state more difficult.
174
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5.5.1 In relation to free movement  
Proportionality has been widely used in connection to cases regarding free movement. The 
application has been strict, but this is natural following that free movement is a fundamental 
principle of EU law. Therefore the ECJ has followed a strict line in applying the principle. 
 
In Cassis de Dijon
175
: The necessity test failed as there was a less restrictive way available, 
namely displaying the alcohol content on the packaging of the drinks. Consequently the re-
quirements for spirits imposed by German law were disproportionate when it was compared 
to the less-restrictive way of informing consumers by way of labeling: 
“Obstacles to movement within the Community resulting from disparities between the nation-
al laws relating to the marketing of the products in question must be accepted in so far as those 
provisions may be recognized as being necessary in order to satisfy mandatory requirements 
relating in particular to the effectiveness of fiscal supervision, the protection of public health, 
the fairness of commercial transactions and the defense of the consumer.”176 
 
In Trojani the ECJ held that:  
“The exercise of that right is subject to the limitations and conditions referred to in that provi-
sion, but the competent authorities must ensure that those limitations and conditions are ap-
plied in compliance with the general principles of Community law, in particular the principle 
of proportionality.”177  
 
In Danish Bottles, regarding a case within the area of domestic environmental protection,  
the ECJ found that “the system for returning non-approved containers is capable of protecting 
the environment and, as far as imports are concerned, affects only limited quantities of bever-
ages compared with the quantity of beverages consumed in Denmark owing to the restrictive 
effect which the requirement that containers should be returnable has on imports. In those 
circumstances, a restriction of the quantity of products which may be marketed by importers 
is disproportionate to the objective pursued”178. Article 34 TFEU prohibits restrictions on the 
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import of goods from other Member States. Environmental issues are often dealt with under 
Article 36, but the protection of the environment has also been recognized as a mandatory 
requirement, especially in the context of recycling schemes and their effect on trade.
179
 
 
In Jipa, Mr. Jipa, a Romanian national was repatriated from Belgium to Romania by virtue of 
a readmission agreement
180
 signed by the two countries. Even though Mr. Jipa in principal 
could rely on the right to move and reside freely within the territory of the EU Member States, 
the ECJ pointed out that the right of freedom of movement is nevertheless not unconditional 
and may be subject to limitations and conditions imposed by the Treaty, in particular on 
grounds of public policy or public security. However, the judgment shows suspicion of 
whether the measure was actually disproportionate, with the court emphasizing that such 
measures, given their fundamental conflict with free movement, should not go beyond what 
was strictly necessary.
181
 This shows that the proportionality principle varies depending on 
what right is infringed. A part of the doubt was whether the Belgian order had in fact been 
legitimate. This was something the national judge should examine. It may be noted that alt-
hough Jipa concerned the Member State of origin of the EU citizen, its logic should be appli-
cable to any state imposing exit restrictions.
182
  
 
In Rottmann, regarding a German citizen who had obtained nationality by deception. The ECJ 
concluded that a Member State, in exercising its powers in the sphere of nationality, may 
withdraw its nationality from a citizen of the Union. This requires that the nationality was 
granted by way of naturalization and that the person obtained the nationality by deception. 
 
In De Peijper the court gives an example of the “least restrictive option” rule being applied 
literally and thoroughly.
183
 The least restrictive option assumes a distinction between the ob-
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jectives of a measure and the means used to pursue those objectives. The Court has been most 
faithful to the strict De Peijper approach in its treatment of market externalities.
184
  
 
In Gebhard, concerning a German lawyer was operating under the title “avvocato” in Italy 
without having registered at the local bar as was required in Italy. The Court held:  
“It follows, however, from the Court’s case law that national measures liable to hinder or 
make less attractive the exercise of fundamental freedoms guaranteed by the Treaty must ful-
fil four conditions: they must be applied in a non-discriminatory manner; they must be justi-
fied by imperative requirements in the general interest; they must be suitable for securing the 
attainment of the objective which they pursue; and they must not go beyond what is necessary 
in order to attain it”.185 The Court does not actually use the term proportionality, but it most 
nevertheless be clear that this is a manifestation of the principle. This case can be read as an 
alternative formulation of the proportionality test as applied to the Member States that bears 
less resemblance to the Fedesa standard.
186
  
 
5.6 Conclusions on EU case law 
The analysis of the proportionality principle in EU law has focused more directly on case law. 
The case law has shown that the proportionality test within EU law consists of three elements, 
necessity, suitability and proportionality in stricto sensu. There is more case law referring to 
the first two elements of the test, but this is natural considering that the test is cumulative.  
 
Further on, the case law has illustrated that the proportionality test varies within the EU de-
pending on the dispute at issue and what rights are infringed. Sauter explains that disparate 
views of the proportionality principle may be explained by the nature of the EU.
187
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6 Conclusion 
This chapter aims to provide a brief overview of the findings of this thesis. I try to point to the 
main differences and similarities in applying the principle of proportionality in WTO law and 
EU law. In addition, I try to point out some challenges that may arise in applying the principle 
of proportionality.  
 
The comparison of the principle of proportionality in WTO law and EU law could have been 
done in greater detail, for example by going through several more cases, but unfortunately, 
there is not room for such a thorough analysis within the frame of this thesis.  
 
6.1 Main differences 
There is far more case law within the area of EU law. Even though both systems aim to facili-
tate international trade to varying degrees, EU embodies several more areas of law than the 
WTO, for example fundamental human rights.  
 
The dispute settlement systems are different, especially in the first instance, where the WTO 
system refers a dispute to ad-hoc panels. In contrast, within the EU a case is brought before 
the General Court.  If a case is appealed it is brought to the Appellate Body in the WTO or the 
ECJ in EU. These courts bear more similarities than the first instances.  
 
In EU law the principle of proportionality has dual tracks as it is applied both to EU acts and 
to acts of the Member states.  In WTO law, the principle of Proportionality is applied between 
Member States in relation to dispute settlement.  
 
The third element of the principle of proportionality as defined in chapter 2 is more apparent 
in EU law than in WTO law.  
 
6.2 Similarities 
Proportionality is often used as a balancing procedure in controversial cases where the dispute 
settlement bodies have a hard time deciding what is right. As stated by Sweet: “each of the 
systems examined, judges adopt PA to deal with the most politically salient, and potentially 
controversial, issues to which they could expect to be exposed”.  
45 
 
 
The suitability requirement of EU law can be said to bear some similarities with the related to 
requirement of Article XX of the GATT. Similarly, the necessity test in EU law can be com-
pared to the necessary requirement in WTO law.  
 
The proportionality test in both regimes, consist of a three-tier test of suitability, necessity and 
proportionality stricto sensu. As mentioned above, the proportionality requirements of EU law 
are cumulative. There is also a similar cumulative requirement in WTO law. WTO measures 
must also be suitable – see for example Brazil - Retreaded Tyres, where the Appellate Body 
held that an import ban must have a genuine relationship of ends and means with the objective 
pursued, in the sense that it must make a material contribution to the realization of the ends. 
This shows that proportionality has influenced both areas of law.  
 
This paper shows that the use of the principle of proportionality is desirable and necessary in 
the dispute settlement systems of the WTO and EU. It is however important that the dispute 
settlement systems apply the principle of proportionality in a coherent manner so that the par-
ties to the relevant dispute can predict the application of the principle. This is not to be under-
stood as an argument for having the exact same content and scope of the principle of propor-
tionality in both regimes. This would be unnatural since the dispute settlement systems deal 
with different cases, especially in the EU. There are however, positive effects of having a 
principle of proportionality which has common elements in the two legal systems. This way, 
application of the principle in one system may influence and improve application of the prin-
ciple in the other.  
 
6.3 Challenges  
The dispute settlement must be more specific in addressing the principle. Even though the 
principle of proportionality is stated in article 5, it must be clear that this cannot be used as a 
general expression of the proportionality principle in EU law. The ECJ must bear an obliga-
tion to further clarify the principle.  
 
There is not just one sole answer to how the principle of proportionality should be used in 
both areas of law or all other areas of law. This might be considered as a challenge, because it 
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impedes a uniform general understanding of the principle. At the same time, this might be 
necessary to keep the dynamic character of the principle of proportionality.  
 
The WTO is member-driven, meaning that the organization is run by its member govern-
ments. Decisions are normally taken by consensus. Since the principle of proportionality may 
have different meanings in different legal systems, it may take time for everybody to agree on 
a meaning it should have in the context of the WTO. 
 
The balancing act can be mainly theoretical and not consider all relevant factors. See for ex-
ample Danish Bottles were a recycling scheme was deemed not to be necessary. Chalmers 
claims that “the Court did not consider economic reality, but merely the theoretical fact that 
other kinds of containers were in principle also recyclable, suggested that environmental pro-
tection was not being taken seriously, and would be subordinated to trade”.188 
 
The EU is a member of the WTO. There may therefore, arise questions to how the general 
principles being developed by the dispute settlement bodies in the WTO may affect the EU 
legislative and political process.  
 
The meaning of the proportionality principle as developed by the ECJ may impact the WTO 
dispute settlement system to a greater extent than other national legislation. This might be 
explained by the EUs member-based characteristics. Rulings from the ECJ already represent a 
consensus by its Member States.  
 
Particularly the EU dispute settlement system has a heavy case load. Important cases will take 
long time to reach a decision. In terms of the judicial review of the EU institutions, as it is 
difficult for national courts to grant it, it will lead to illegal EU measures persisting longer 
than they should. The same may not be said with regard to the WTO dispute settlement sys-
tem, where the panels and Appellate Body operate under very strict and timeframes.  
 
The WTO is a young system and can be argued to be rather fragile. It is still unclear how the 
Appellate Body will rule on certain issues, since there are still many provisions in the WTO 
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system that yet has to be contested. The meaning of terms like necessity, least restrictive 
means and relating to are dynamic terms which may vary depending on areas of law and the 
specific dispute. There are both positive and negative effects of the dynamic character of such 
terms.  
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